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I. INTRODUCTION
In 1993, while other juniors at Fox High School were planning their ca-
reers and what colleges they were going to attend, seventeen-year-old student
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and the faculty of the Law Center, especially Professor Steven J. Wisotsky, for their support
and guidance.
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Christopher Simmons was planning a gruesome and egregious murder.'
Simmons described his plan to his friends in "chilling, callous terms" about
how he wanted to find someone to burglarize, tie the victim up, and ulti-
mately push the victim off a bridge.2 Simmons assured his friends Charles
Benjamin, fifteen, and John Tessmer, sixteen, that because they were juve-
niles "they could 'get away with it."' 3
In the late evening of September 8, 1993, Simmons met with his two
friends; however, Tessmer dropped out of the plot and went home.' Sim-
mons and Benjamin continued on their mission to commit burglary, hoping
to find drug money.' At random, they picked the home of forty-six-year-old
Shirley Crook.6 Finding a window cracked open, they reached in, opened it,
and entered into Crook's home.' Mrs. Crook saw a hallway light turn on and
asked, "'Who's there?"' 8 Simmons entered into her bedroom and "he recog-
nized her from a previous car accident." 9 Simmons then realized Mrs. Crook
could identify them, so he panicked and "'decided to kill her, so she
wouldn't snitch on them.""' Simmons next ordered Mrs. Crook to get out of
her bed." Then, while Benjamin stood guard, Simmons used duct tape to
bind her hands as well as to cover her eyes and mouth.' 2 They put Mrs.
Crook in her minivan, bound and gagged her, and drove around looking for a
place to kill her.'3 They stopped at a state park, forced her out of the van,
and noticed that she had removed the tape from her arms and her mouth. 4
They then proceeded to cover her entire face with duct tape as well as a
towel and hog-tied her by tying her hands and feet together with electrical
cable. 5 They took her to the railroad trestle, forty feet above the Meramec
River, kicked her off the side of a bridge, and watched her drown in the cold
1. Tim Rowden, Inmate Imagines His Final Walk to Execution: Simmons Hopes Court
Decision Will Keep Him from Taking It for Real, ST. Louis POST-DISPATCH, June 17, 2002, at
Al [hereinafter Rowden I].
2. Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 556 (2005).
3. Id.
4. Id.
5. Rowden I, supra note 1.
6. Id.
7. Roper, 543 U.S. at 556.
8. Id.
9. Id.
10. Kim Bell, Woman Thrown into River Alive; Teen-agers Bound Her, Police Say, ST.
LOUIS POST-DISPATCH, Sept. 12, 1993, at ID (quoting Ferguson police lieutenant).
11. Brief for the Petitioner at 4, Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 (2005) (No. 03-633).
12. Id.
13. Rowden I, supra note 1.
14. Brief for the Petitioner, supra note 11, at 4.
15. Id.
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waters below. 16 As a result of the burglary, Simmons and Benjamin only
procured about six dollars from Mrs. Crook's purse.' 7 "'It's a cheap price for
a life,"' the local police lieutenant said.'
8
The next day, her husband, Steven Crook, returned home from an over-
night trip to find his bedroom in disarray. 9 Steven Crook testified that when
he arrived "the couple's poodle was whimpering" and "the dog [was]
wrapped in duct tape on the bed in the master bedroom."2 Meanwhile,
Simmons was busy bragging to his friends that he "killed a woman 'because
the bitch seen my face.'' "That same afternoon, two fishermen found Mrs.
Crook's body floating in the Meramec River, three quarters of a mile down-
stream from the railroad trestle. 22 The medical examiner determined that
the cause of death was drowning and that Mrs. Crook was fully conscious
and alive before being pushed from the bridge.' He also "testified that
Shirley Crook's face had been bound with duct tape with only an area for her
nose visible" and was battered with "29 bruises on her body and four frac-
tured ribs."24
Shirley Crook was forty-six when she died: a wife, a mother of two,
and unbeknownst to her at that time, soon to be a grandmother.25 Her daugh-
ter learned that she was pregnant two weeks after the murder.26 The murder
caused great anguish among Mrs. Crook's family.27 Mrs. Crook's mother
died of a heart attack shortly after she was murdered.28 A few years later,
Mrs. Crook's husband also died of a heart attack.29 The two were high
school sweethearts, and family members expressed that he never got over the
agony of losing his wife.30
In all likelihood, Simmons never envisioned that his actions would lead
to such a great deal of controversy-not only among our nation, but also
16. Tim Rowden, Killer's Stay of Execution Prolongs Family's Agony, Sister of Victim
Says, ST. LOUIS POST-DISPATCH, June 3, 2002, at 5 [hereinafter Rowden H].
17. Bell, supra note 10.
18. Id.
19. Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 557 (2005).
20. Leo Fitzmaurice, Jury Will Get Case of Drowning Death, ST. LOUIS PosT-DISPATCH,
June 16, 1994, at 3C.
21. Roper, 543 U.S. at 557.
22. Brief for the Petitioner, supra note 11, at 5.
23. Id.
24. Fitzmaurice, supra note 20.
25. Rowden II, supra note 16.
26. Id.
27. See id.
28. Id.
29. Id.
30. Rowden II, supra note 16.
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worldwide. This article discusses the fate of Simmons and the juvenile death
penalty.31 Part H discusses the controversy that arose over Simmons' case,
including how it reached the United States Supreme Court and the relevant
precedent. Part III discusses the international community's disdain for the
juvenile death penalty, including arguments made by England and the Euro-
pean Union in their amici curiae briefs submitted to the Court in support of
Simmons. Part IV analyzes the Court's rationale for abolishing the juvenile
death penalty and the reasons why the dissenters opposed the abolition. Fi-
nally, Part V illustrates the effects of the Court's decision around the nation
and in Florida, specifically detailing the number of juveniles on death row at
the time whose lives were spared.
II. THE CONTROVERSY
A. The Trial
Simmons was charged with burglary, kidnapping, stealing, and first-
degree murder-there was little question as to his guilt.32 The State intro-
duced an overwhelming weight of evidence against Simmons, including his
own confession to the murder, a video-taped reenactment of the scene, along
with testimony from his friend, John Tessmer, stating that Simmons had dis-
cussed the plot with him and later bragged about it.33 The defense did not
call any witnesses.' The jury found Simmons guilty and the trial proceeded
to the penalty phase.35
The State sought capital punishment.36 Family members of Simmons
took the stand and testified about the close relationship they had with him
and described some of the kind acts he had performed in his life, such as
taking care of his two younger half-brothers.37 Simmons' counsel introduced
mitigating factors, most significantly, his lack of any prior criminal history
and his age. 38 In response, the prosecutor used Simmons' age as a double-
edged sword. He argued that it was "[q]uite the contrary" of a mitigating
factor stating: "Seventeen years old. Isn't that scary? Doesn't that scare
31. The term "juvenile death penalty" used throughout this article refers to the imposition
of the death penalty on those under the age of eighteen years old.
32. Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 557 (2005).
33. Id.
34. Id.
35. Id.
36. Id.
37. Roper, 543 U.S. at 558.
38. Id.
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you? Mitigating? Quite the contrary I submit. Quite the contrary. ' 39 "The
jury found three statutory aggravating factors"' and recommended the death
sentence, which the judge imposed."
B. Post-Conviction Proceedings
Simmons applied to the trial court for post-conviction relief alleging in-
effective assistance of counsel at trial based on his counsel's failure to intro-
duce Simmons' alcohol and drug usage.42 The court found no constitutional
violation and denied the motion.43 Simmons took a consolidated appeal to
the Supreme Court of Missouri, which affirmed the trial court's denial of
post-conviction relief.44 The federal courts, specifically the United States
District Court for the Eastern District of Missouri and the Court of Appeals
for the Eighth Circuit, also denied Simmons' writ of habeas corpus.
45
After these numerous post-conviction relief efforts were made, the
United States Supreme Court decided Atkins v. Virginia,4 6 holding that the
Eighth Amendment forbids the imposition of the death penalty on mentally
retarded persons.47 Based on Atkins, Simmons filed a new motion for post-
conviction relief alleging that a similar national consensus has developed
against executing juveniles.48
The Missouri Supreme Court agreed, finding that "a national consensus
has developed against the execution of juvenile offenders." '49 Based on this
finding and a prediction of how the United States Supreme Court would cur-
rently decide the constitutionality of the juvenile death penalty, the Supreme
39. Id.
40. Brief for the Respondent at 5, Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 (2005) (No. 03-633).
The jury found the following three statutory aggravating factors; that the murder was: 1)
"committed for the purpose of receiving money"; 2) "outrageously and wantonly vile, horri-
ble, and inhuman" because it involved torture and depravity of the mind; and 3) "committed
for the purpose of avoiding . . . a lawful arrest." Id. at 5 (quoting Mo. ANN. STAT. §
565.032(2) (West 1999)).
41. Roper, 543 U.S. at 558.
42. Id. at 558-59.
43. Id. at 559.
44. Id. (citing State v. Simmons, 944 S.W.2d 165, 169 (Mo. 1997) (en banc), cert denied,
522 U.S. 953 (1997)).
45. Id. (citing Simmons v. Bowersox, 235 F.3d 1124, 1127 (8th Cir. 2001), cert. denied,
534 U.S. 924 (2001)).
46. 536 U.S. 304 (2002).
47. Id. at 321.
48. State ex rel. Simmons v. Roper, 112 S.W.3d 397, 399 (Mo. 2003) (en banc), cert.
granted, 540 U.S. 1160 (2004).
49. Id.
2006]
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Court of Missouri "set[] aside Mr. Simmons' death sentence and re-
sentence[d] him ... to life imprisonment without eligibility for probation,
parole, or release except by act of the Governor."5° In 2004, the United
States Supreme Court granted certiorari to address the issue of whether a
national consensus has in fact developed against imposing the death penalty
on juveniles.51
C. Relevant Precedent
1. Eighth Amendment Jurisprudence
The Eighth Amendment of the United States Constitution contains a
provision against the infliction of "cruel and unusual punishments. 52 The
United States Supreme Court has held that this proscription must be observed
not only by the Federal Government, but also by the states through the Due
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.53 The Court has acknowl-
edged that "[t]he authors of the Eighth Amendment... made no attempt to
define [its] contours"' and has frequently acknowledged the difficulty in
defining what constitutes "cruel and unusual."55 Although there is no precise
definition of what is "cruel and unusual," the Court has sought guidance in
determining whether a particular punishment is categorically prohibited by
the Eighth Amendment by referring to "the evolving standards of decency
that mark the progress of a maturing society. ' 6
To determine what the "evolving standards" are, the Court has empha-
sized that such an inquiry should not be based on the subjective views of the
Justices, but rather on "objective factors to the maximum possible extent." 57
The Court has found that laws enacted by states' legislatures provide "[tihe
clearest and most reliable objective evidence of contemporary values."58
Additionally, the Court has referenced the behavior of sentencing juries.59
50. Id. at 413.
51. Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 555-56, 560 (2005).
52. U.S. CONST. amend. VIH.
53. E.g., Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660, 675 (1962) (Douglas, J., concurring).
54. Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815, 821 (1988).
55. E.g., Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 376 (1972) (Burger, J., dissenting) ("[T]he
ban on 'cruel and unusual punishments' is one of the most difficult to translate into judicially
manageable terms.").
56. Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 101 (1958).
57. Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584, 592 (1977).
58. Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302, 331 (1989), abrogated by Atkins v. Virginia, 536
U.S. 304, 307 (2002).
59. Thompson, 487 U.S. at 831.
[Vol. 30:3:473
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This section of the article focuses on Supreme Court decisions discussing the
Eighth Amendment's contours.
2. Thompson v. Oklahoma
In Thompson v. Oklahoma, the petitioner was fifteen years old when he
murdered his former brother-in-law, with the help of three men, by shooting
the victim and by cutting his throat, chest, and abdomen. 60 They chained
concrete blocks to his body and threw him into a river where the victim's
body remained for nearly four weeks before being discovered. 6' The peti-
tioner was convicted of murder in the first degree and, by the jury's recom-
mendation, was sentenced to capital punishment.62
The case reached the United States Supreme Court where the Court
considered whether the execution of a person who was fifteen-years-old at
the time of committing a capital offense violates the constitutional prohibi-
tion against "cruel and unusual punishment. 63 In evaluating the contours of
the Eighth Amendment, guided by the "'evolving standards of decency,"' the
Court looked at two societal factors in confronting the issue before it: first,
relevant legislative enactments, and second, jury determinations.64 In assess-
ing these factors, coupled with an independent assessment of the issue, the
Court ultimately concluded "that the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments
prohibit the execution of a person who was under 16 years of age at the time
of his or her offense. 65
Looking at the legislative enactments, the Court recognized the differ-
ences in the law "which must be accommodated in determining the rights
and duties of children as compared with those of adults."'  The Court em-
phasized that in Oklahoma "a minor is not eligible to vote, to sit on a jury, to
marry without parental consent, or to purchase alcohol or cigarettes. ' 67 In
addition, most states are also in conformance with such legislation that im-
poses restrictions on minors with regard to driving, gambling, and the pur-
chase of pornographic materials.68 Every state has created a juvenile justice
system in which most juvenile offenders are not held criminally responsi-
60. Id. at 819.
61. Id.
62. Id. at 818, 820.
63. Thompson, 487 U.S. at 820.
64. Id. at 821-22 (citations omitted).
65. id. at 838.
66. Id. at 823.
67. Id. (footnotes omitted).
68. Thompson, 487 U.S. at 824 (citations omitted).
2006]
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ble. 9 The Court concluded that "[a]ll of this legislation is consistent with the
experience of mankind, as well as the long history of our law, that the normal
15-year-old is not prepared to assume the full responsibilities of an adult. 7°
Additionally, the Court addressed state legislation concerning the death
penalty, finding that "[m]ost state legislatures have not expressly confronted
the question of establishing a minimum age for [its] imposition."' At the
time of the decision, there were nineteen states that authorized capital pun-
ishment, but had no minimum age to impose such punishment.72 However,
the Court pointed to eighteen death penalty states that had expressly deline-
ated an age limit to their death penalty statutes.73 The Court attached a par-
ticular importance to the fact that all eighteen of the these states had limited
their imposition of the death penalty to those offenders who were at least the
age of sixteen at the time the capital offense was committed.74
The Court also looked at the behavior of sentencing juries.75 The Court
found that, in the twentieth century, imposition of the death penalty by juries
on those who were under the age of sixteen when committing the capital
offense was exceedingly rare.76 Further demonstrating the rarity of its prac-
tice, the Court referred to Department of Justice statistics from 1982 to 1986
that showed of the 1393 offenders sentenced to death, only five of them were
under sixteen years of age at the time of the offense.77 The Court deemed
these five young offenders' sentences as "'cruel and unusual in the same way
that being struck by lightning is cruel and unusual." 78 Based on juries' hesi-
tation to impose death sentences on such young individuals, the Court con-
cluded "that the imposition of the death penalty on a 15-year-old offender is
now generally abhorrent to the conscience of the community. ' 79
In addition to legislative enactments and the behavior of juries, the
Court undertook its own analysis of whether the Eighth Amendment permits
the imposition of the death penalty on a fifteen-year-old offender.80 In mak-
ing an independent judgment, the Court analyzed two pivotal concerns: first,
69. Id. at 823-24.
70. Id. at 824-25.
71. Id. at 826.
72. Id. at 826-27 (citations omitted).
73. Thompson, 487 U.S. at 829.
74. Id. (citations omitted).
75. Id. at 831.
76. See id. at 832.
77. Id. at 832-33.
78. Thompson, 487 U.S. at 833 (quoting Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 309 (1972)
(Stewart, J., concurring)).
79. Id. at 832.
80. Id. at 833.
[Vol. 30:3:473
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"whether the juvenile's culpability should be measured by the same standard
as that of an adult" and, second, "whether the application of the death penalty
to this class of offenders 'measurably contributes' to the social purposes that
are served by the death penalty."
8
'
The Court found that "less culpability should attach to a crime commit-
ted by a juvenile than to a comparable crime committed by an adult," based
on juveniles' lack of experience, education, and intelligence that impairs
juveniles' ability to assess the consequences of their actions.8 2 Furthermore,
the multitude of reasons why juveniles are not given the same privileges and
responsibilities of adults "also explain[s] why their irresponsible conduct is
not as morally reprehensible as that of an adult."8 3
Additionally, the Court found that the retribution and deterrence pur-
poses of the death penalty were not served when imposed on those who
committed crimes under the age of sixteen.84 Retribution is not furthered by
the execution of a fifteen-year-old offender "[g]iven the lesser culpability of
the juvenile offender, the teenager's capacity for growth, and society's fidu-
ciary obligations to its children., 85 Likewise, the Court found that the deter-
rent function of the death penalty was not effective when imposed on juve-
nile offenders.86 The Court's reasoned that juveniles are not likely to make a
cost-benefit analysis of the possibility of being executed, and, even if they
do, given the extreme rareness of executing such individuals in the twentieth
century, it would be unlikely that such an individual would be deterred by
the possibility of such a rare sanction.87
3. Stanford v. Kentucky
Nearly a year after deciding Thompson, the Court again addressed the
constitutionality of the juvenile death penalty in Stanford v. Kentucky. 88 In
Stanford, there were two consolidated cases with one ultimate issue before
the Court: whether the imposition of the death penalty on an individual who
commits a capital offense "at 16 or 17 years of age constitutes cruel and un-
usual punishment" in violation of the Eighth Amendment.8 9 One of the peti-
tioners, Kevin Stanford, was seventeen-years-old when he committed mur-
81. Id. (quoting Enmund v. Florida, 458 U.S. 782, 798 (1982)).
82. Id. at 835.
83. Thompson, 487 U.S. at 835.
84. See id. at 836-37.
85. Id.
86. Id. at 837.
87. Id. at 837-38.
88. 492 U.S. 361, 368 (1989), abrogated by Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 (2005).
89. Id. at 364-65.
2006]
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der.90 Stanford and an accomplice robbed a gas station, "repeatedly raped
and sodomized" the twenty-year-old attendant, and then shot her at close
range in the face.9' Stanford was convicted of first-degree murder and sen-
tenced to death.92 The other petitioner, Heath Wilkins, was sixteen years old
when he and an accomplice stabbed to the death a twenty-six-year old store
clerk while robbing a convenience store.93 Wilkins was also convicted of
first-degree murder and sentenced to death.94
Consistent with Thompson, the Court again assessed the "'evolving
standards of decency that mark the progress of a maturing society."' 95 Writ-
ing for the majority, Justice Scalia emphasized that in making Eighth
Amendment evaluations, the Court has not looked at its own independent
"conceptions of decency, but to those of modem American society as a
whole." 96 As mandated by the language of the Eighth Amendment, what is
cruel and unusual should not be decided by the "'subjective views of indi-
vidual Justices; judgment should be informed by objective factors to the
maximum possible extent.' 97 Further admonishing what an Eighth Amend-
ment judgment should not include, Justice Scalia delineated that the concep-
tions of decency in other countries are not relevant-nor are public opinion
polls and the views of interests groups and various professional associa-
tions.98
The relevant objective indicium looked at once again to "'reflect the
public attitude toward a given sanction ' ' 99 were legislative enactmentsl °° and
the behavior of juries.' The Court found that out of the thirty-seven death
penalty states, only fifteen prohibited its imposition on sixteen-year-old of-
fenders and twelve prohibited its imposition on seventeen-year-old offend-
ers."°2 The Court concluded that these legislative enactments did "not estab-
lish the degree of national consensus this Court has previously thought suffi-
cient to label a particular punishment cruel and unusual."' 3 As a benchmark,
90. Id. at 365.
91. Id.
92. Id. at 366.
93. Stanford, 492 U.S. at 366.
94. Id. at 367.
95. Id. at 369 (quoting Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 101 (1958)).
96. Id.
97. Id. (quoting Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584, 592 (1977)).
98. Stanford, 492 U.S. at 369 n.1, 377.
99. Id. at 370 (quoting McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279, 300 (1987)).
100. Id. at 369-70.
101. Id. at 373.
102. Id. at 370.
103. Stanford, 492 U.S. at 370-71.
[Vol. 30:3:473
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the Court provided a summary of instances when it previously found the
evidence of a national consensus sufficient to characterize a particular pun-
ishment as cruel and unusual:
In invalidating the death penalty for rape of an adult woman, we
stressed that Georgia was the sole jurisdiction that authorized such
a punishment. In striking down capital punishment for participa-
tion in a robbery in which an accomplice takes a life, we empha-
sized that only eight jurisdictions authorized similar punishment.
In finding that the Eighth Amendment precludes execution of the
insane and thus requires an adequate hearing on the issue of sanity,
we relied upon (in addition to the common-law rule) the fact that
"no State in the Union" permitted such punishment. And in strik-
ing down a life sentence without parole under a recidivist statute,
we stressed that "[iut appears that [petitioner] was treated more se-
verely than he would have been in any other State." 1 4
Unlike these cases, the Court did not find a national consensus against the
death penalty of sixteen and seventeen-year-old offenders because the major-
ity of states authorized the death penalty for such offenders.' 5
The Court next looked at the behavior of juries in imposing the death
penalty upon sixteen or seventeen-year-old offenders. °6 While only two
percent of executions between 1642 and 1986 were for crimes committed by
offenders under the age of eighteen, Justice Scalia did not find these statistics
sufficient.'0 7 Justice Scalia argued, rather than showing that prosecutors and
juries felt the death sentence is categorically unacceptable for those offenders
under the age of eighteen, it shows instead that they believe it should rarely
be imposed.'08 Additionally, this discrepancy in treatment can be attributed
to the fact that juveniles commit a far smaller percentage of capital crimes
than adults."°
The Court also responded to the petitioner's argument that because the
legal age for various activities such as drinking alcoholic beverages and vot-
ing is set at the age of eighteen, the death penalty should also be set at eight-
een."' Justice Scalia did not see the connection between these activities:
104. Id. at 371 (citations omitted).
105. See id. at 371-72.
106. Id. at 373.
107. Id. at 373-74.
108. Stanford, 492 U.S. at 374.
109. Id.
110. Id.
2006]
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It is, to begin with, absurd to think that one must be mature enough
to drive carefully, to drink responsibly, or to vote intelligently, in
order to be mature enough to understand that murdering another
human being is profoundly wrong, and to conform one's conduct
to that most minimal of all civilized standards .... These laws set
the appropriate ages for the operation of a system that makes its
determinations in gross, and that does not conduct individualized
maturity tests for each driver, drinker, or voter. The criminal jus-
tice system, however, does provide individualized testing. In the
realm of capital punishment in particular, "individualized consid-
eration [is] a constitutional requirement.""'
Based on the legislative enactments and the behavior of juries, the Court
held that neither a historical nor a modem national consensus existed forbid-
ding the imposition of the death penalty on an individual who committed a
capital offense at the age of sixteen or seventeen." 2 Accordingly, the Court
concluded that such punishment was not deemed cruel and unusual and con-
sequently did not violate the Eighth Amendment." 3 Justice O'Connor con-
curred in the judgment of the Court, stating that "[t]he day may come when
there is such general legislative rejection of the execution of 16- or 17-year-
old capital murderers that a clear national consensus can be said to have de-
veloped," but that she did not believe that day had yet arrived."
4
4. Penry v. Lynaugh
On the same day the Court decided Stanford, it also decided another
Eighth Amendment case, Penry v. Lynaugh."5 In 1979 the petitioner,
Johnny Penry, violently raped a Texas woman and then stabbed her to death
with scissors. 16 Despite the fact that Penry was mentally retarded, he was
sentenced to death for his brutal crime.' '7 The issue before the Court was
whether the Eighth Amendment categorically prohibits the imposition of the
death penalty on the mentally retarded." 8 Once again, to determine if there
was a national consensus against such a practice, the Court looked at the
111. Id. at 374-75 (citation omitted).
112. Id. at 380.
113. Stanford, 492 U.S. at 380.
114. Id. at 381-82 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
115. 492 U.S. 302 (1989).
116. Id. at 307.
117. Id. at 307, 310.
118. Id. at307.
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objective evidence of legislative enactments and the actions of sentencing
juries."9
First, in looking at legislative enactments, the Court noted that "[o]nly
one State . . . currently bans execution of retarded persons who have been
found guilty of a capital offense."'"0 Maryland had also adopted a similar
statute to take effect that year.' 2' The Court found that the legislation by
these two states was not sufficient evidence to amount to a national consen-
sus against such punishment. 2 2 To the contrary, when the Court found a
national consensus against the execution of the mentally insane, no state then
permitted the execution of the insane.2 3
The Court also looked at the behavior of juries and likewise concluded
that there was a lack of evidence, finding no facts as to the general behavior
of juries in regards to sentencing mentally retarded defendants to death. 24
The Court disregarded public opinion polls against the execution of the men-
tally retarded, recognizing that they may be ultimately expressed in legisla-
tion, which is objective indicia the Court considers in a national consensus
evaluation.2 5
Lastly, the Court evaluated whether the mentally retarded could act with
the degree of culpability required to justify the death penalty. 6 The Court
admitted "that mental retardation has long been regarded as a factor that may
diminish an individual's culpability for a criminal act."' 27 However, it rec-
ognized that the states already have procedural safeguards to protect the
mentally retarded by recognizing their limited levels of culpability as a miti-
gating factor in death penalty statutes; for example: "'[t]he capacity of the
defendant to appreciate the criminality of his conduct or to conform his con-
duct to the requirements of law was substantially impaired.""128
The Court refused to generalize the level of culpability of all mentally
retarded people: "In light of the diverse capacities and life experiences of
mentally retarded persons, it cannot be said on the record before us today
that all mentally retarded people, by definition, can never act with the level
119. Id. at 331.
120. Penry, 492 U.S. at 334 (citing GA. CODE ANN. § 17-7-131(j) (2004)).
121. Id. (citation omitted); see MD. CODE ANN., CRIM. LAW § 2-202(b)(2)(ii) (LexisNexis
2002).
122. Penry, 492 U.S. at 334.
123. Id. (citing Ford v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 399, 408 n.2 (1986)).
124. Id.
125. Id. at 334-35.
126. Id. at 336.
127. Penry, 492 U.S. at 337 (citations omitted).
128. Id. (quoting ALA. CODE § 13A-5-51(6) (LexisNexis 1994)).
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of culpability associated with the death penalty."' 129 Ultimately, the Court
held that, while mental retardation may lessen a defendant's culpability for a
capital offense, according to the Eighth Amendment, mental retardation itself
does not categorically preclude the execution of a person convicted of a capi-
tal offense.
30
5. Atkins v. Virginia
Thirteen years later, the Court revisited the issue of the constitutionality
of executing the mentally retarded in Atkins v. Virginia.13 ' The petitioner,
Daryl Renard Atkins, and an accomplice robbed and murdered a man, shoot-
ing him eight times with a semiautomatic handgun. 132 The jury sentenced
Atkins, a mentally retarded man, to death.
33
The Court took note of a "dramatic shift in the state legislative land-
scape that ha[d] occurred in the past 13 years," so it granted certiorari to re-
visit the issue from Penry. 134 The Court considered these recent and consis-
tent legislative enactments, the reluctance of juries to impose the death pen-
alty upon the mentally retarded, the Court's independent assessment of pe-
nology, and the mental capacity of the mentally retarded and ultimately con-
cluded that executing the mentally retarded violates the Eighth Amend-
ment. 135
Looking at the legislative enactments since Penry was decided, the
Court observed significant changes:
In 1990, Kentucky and TennesSee enacted statutes similar to those
in Georgia and Maryland, as did New Mexico in 1991, and Arkan-
sas, Colorado, Washington, Indiana, and Kansas in 1993 and 1994.
In 1995, when New York reinstated its death penalty, it emulated
the Federal Government by expressly exempting the mentally re-
tarded. Nebraska followed suit in 1998. There appear to have
been no similar enactments during the next two years, but in 2000
and 2001 six more States-South Dakota, Arizona, Connecticut,
Florida, Missouri, and North Carolina-joined the procession.
The Texas Legislature unanimously adopted a similar bill, and
129. Id. at 338-39.
130. Id. at 340.
131. 536 U.S. 304, 310 (2002).
132. Id. at 307.
133. Id. at 309.
134. Id. at310.
135. See id. at 321.
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bills have passed at least one house in other States, including Vir-
ginia and Nevada. 1
36
While only two states in 1989 had statutes prohibiting the death penalty
for mentally retarded offenders, in 2002 there was a total of eighteen states
with such statutes. 37 The Court found that it is not the number of states with
such statutes that is significant; rather, it is the consistent direction of change,
coupled with the fact that it is a time when anti-crime legislation is more
popular than providing protections for criminal defendants.
31
Even in states without these statutes, the Court found evidence of a na-
tional consensus against executing mentally retarded offenders by the fact
that juries hesitate to impose such punishment. 39 While states such as New
Hampshire and New Jersey do not statutorily prohibit imposition of the death
penalty on the mentally retarded, it has not been carried out for decades.'
4
Only five states have executed an offender with an IQ below seventy since
Penry was decided. 41 The Court concluded that the practice of executing the
mentally retarded had "become truly unusual.' 42
The Court proceeded with two additional reasons, "consistent with the
[national] consensus that the mentally retarded should be categorically ex-
cluded" from receiving the death penalty: 1) the penological goals of the
death penalty are not justified when applied to mentally retarded offenders;
and 2) the reduced capacity of the mentally retarded make them ineligible for
the death penalty. 
14
The two prominent goals of the death penalty are "retribution and deter-
rence of capital crimes."' 44 The Court found that the goal of retribution is not
met when the death penalty is imposed on the mentally retarded: "[i]f the
culpability of the average murderer is insufficient to justify the most extreme
sanction available to the State, the lesser culpability of the mentally retarded
offender surely does not merit that form of retribution."' 45 Likewise, the
Court concluded that the goal of deterrence is not met by executing the men-
tally retarded, finding that inherent in such persons are "cognitive and behav-
ioral impairments" that make it unlikely that they will be able to process the
136. Atkins, 536 U.S. at 314-15. (footnotes omitted).
137. See id. (citations omitted).
138. Id. at315-16.
139. See id. at 316.
140. Id.
141. Atkins, 536 U.S. at 316; see Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302 (1989).
142. Atkins, 536 U.S. at 316.
143. Id. at 318-21.
144. Id. at 319 (quoting Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 183 (1976)).
145. Id.
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nature and consequences of their conduct and control their conduct based
upon that information.
46
The Court found that the reduced capacity of the mentally retarded pro-
vides further justification against imposing the death penalty upon such indi-
viduals.1 47 In addition to the increased likelihood of false confessions, the
mentally retarded may have trouble assisting their counsel, "and their de-
meanor may create an unwarranted impression of lack of remorse for their
crimes. '  The Court concluded that the mentally retarded are especially
prone to being wrongfully convicted. 49 This case would lay the analytical
framework for assessing the constitutionality of the juvenile death penalty.
III. INTERNATIONAL INFLUENCE
The case of Roper v. Simmons has generated an unusually large number
of amicus briefs filed on behalf of Christopher Simmons, the Respondent,
from various organizations representing international, religious, child advo-
cacy, and professional and legal communities. 50 Premised on different rea-
146. Id. at 320.
147. Atkins, 536 U.S. at 320.
148. Id. at 320-21.
149. Id. at 321.
150. See, e.g., Brief for the American Bar Ass'n as Amici Curiae Supporting the Respon-
dent, Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 (2005) (No. 03-633); Brief for the American Medical
Ass'n et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting the Respondent, Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551
(2005) (No. 03-633); Brief for the American Psychological Ass'n & the Missouri Psychologi-
cal Ass'n as Amici Curiae Supporting the Respondent, Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551
(2005) (No. 03-633); Brief for the Coalition for Juvenile Justice as Amici Curiae Supporting
the Respondent, Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 (2005) (No. 03-633); Brief for the Constitu-
tion Project as Amici Curiae Supporting the Respondent, Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551
(2005) (No. 03-633); Brief for the European Union et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting the
Respondent, Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 (2005) (No. 03-633) [hereinafter Brief for the
European Union]; Brief for Former U.S. Diplomats Morton Abramowitz et al. as Amici Cu-
riae Supporting the Respondent, Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 (2005) (No. 03-633); Brief
for the Human Rights Committee of the Bar of England and Wales et al. as Amici Curiae
Supporting the Respondent, 543 U.S. 551 (2005) (No. 03-633) [hereinafter Brief for England];
Brief for the Juvenile Law Center et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting the Respondent, Roper v.
Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 (2005) (No. 03-633); Brief for the NAACP Legal Defense and Educa-
tional Fund, Inc. et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting the Respondent, Roper v. Simmons, 543
U.S. 551 (2005) (No. 03-633); Brief for the National Legal Aid and Defender Ass'n as Amici
Curiae Supporting the Respondent, Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 (2005) (No. 03-633);
Brief for New York et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting the Respondent, Roper v. Simmons,
543 U.S. 551 (2005) (No. 03-633); Brief for President James Earl Carter, Jr. et al. as Amici
Curiae Supporting the Respondent, Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 (2005) (No. 03-633);
Brief for the United States Conference of Catholic Bishops and Other Religious Organizations
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soning and beliefs, there was clearly one shared belief amongst them all: the
United States Supreme Court should prohibit the juvenile death penalty and
spare the juvenile defendant's life. 5 ' While this article does not address all
of the concerns included in the various amicus briefs, it will discuss some of
the international issues, which caused a great deal of controversy in the ac-
tual decision by the Supreme Court.
15 2
A. England and Wales
On July 15, 2004, England submitted a brief of amici curiae in support
of Simmons, urging the Court to prohibit the juvenile death penalty.'53 Eng-
land asserted that a prohibition against executing persons who were under the
age of eighteen at the time of committing a crime has now reached the status
of 'jus cogens, a peremptory norm of international law" which is beyond the
status of customary international law."5
England explained that international law is relevant in the United States
because "[f]rom the beginning, the laws of the United States have been in-
formed and shaped by laws and opinions of other members of the interna-
tional community. ' ' 155 This amici brief made note of the Founders influence
by international and social thought, as well as the Court's "recogni[tion of]
the relevance of international norms when considering the permissibility of
practices" under the Constitution. 56 International law has been particularly
relevant in determining the boundaries of the Eighth Amendment in defining
what punishments are "cruel and unusual."' 57 This amici brief asserted that
viewing "the evolving standard[s] of decency in an isolated and insular do-
mestic environment would be contrary to all that the drafters of the Constitu-
tion knew as essential to joining the ranks of nations."'58 Additionally, based
on the shared values and close relationship between the United States and the
United Kingdom, this amici brief asserted that the law and opinions of the
as Amici Curiae Supporting the Respondent, Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 (2005) (No.
03-633).
151. See, e.g., Brief for England, supra note 150, at 3.
152. See Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 628 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (stating that
"'[a]cknowledgment' of foreign approval has no place in the legal opinion of this Court").
153. Brief for England, supra note 150, at 3. Signatories to the brief included the Human
Rights Committee of the Bar of England and Wales, Human Rights Advocates, Human Rights
Watch, and the World Organization for Human Rights USA. Id. at 1.
154. Id. at 3.
155. Id.
156. Id. at 5-6.
157. Brief for England, supra note 150, at 6-7.
158. Id. at 7.
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United Kingdom are particularly relevant in the Court's evaluation of the
contours of the Eighth Amendment. 5 9 Since 1948, at a time when British
law still accepted the death penalty, statutory developments in England pro-
hibited the execution of persons under the age of eighteen at the time of the
offense. 0
Aside from British law, England asserted that the practice of executing
persons who were under the age of eighteen at the time of the commission of
the crime "has been rejected by every nation in the world except the United
States.' 6' Hence, the prohibition of such practice is now ajus cogens norm,
defined as "'a norm accepted and recognized by the international community
of States as a whole as a norm from which no derogation is permitted and
which can be modified only by a subsequent norm of general international
law having the same character. ' ' 162 England explained that a norm must
meet four requirements in order to be considered ajus cogens norm: "1) it is
general international law; 2) it is accepted by a large majority of states; 3) it
is immune from derogation; and 4) it has not been modified by a new norm
of the same status.' 63
This amici brief elucidated how each of these requirements has been
met. 164 First, general international law clearly prohibits the juvenile death
penalty, as evidenced by "[n]umerous treaties, declarations, and pronounce-
ments by international bodies, as well as the laws of the vast majority of na-
tions."'65 Second, the prohibition of the juvenile death penalty is accepted by
a large majority of states." This amici brief contended every country in the
world has ratified the Convention on the Rights of the Child which prohibits
the juvenile death penalty, 67 except the United States and Somalia-"a coun-
try lacking a central government."'' 68 As to the third requirement for a jus
cogens norm, the prohibition against the juvenile death penalty is "non-
derogable," as explicitly expressed in the International Covenant, as well as
159. Id. at8.
160. Id. at 11.
161. Id. at 12.
162. ' Brief for England, supra note 150, at 13 (quoting Vienna Convention on the Law of
Treaties, art. 53, opened for signature May 23, 1969, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331).
163. Id.
164. See id. at 13-22.
165. Id. at 13.
166. Id. at 17.
167. Brief for England, supra note 150, at 18 (citing Convention on the Rights of the
Child, G.A. Res. 44/25, art. 37(a) (Nov. 20, 1989)).
168. Id. (citing The Secretary-General, Report of the Secretary-General on the Status of
the Convention on the Rights of the Child, Annex I, delivered to the Economic and Social
Council, U.N. Doc. EICN.4/2001/"4 (Dec. 5, 2000)).
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evidenced by the laws and practices of other nations.69 Lastly, "[a]s to the..
. final requirement, there is no emerging norm that contradicts the current
norm. The prohibition of the juvenile death penalty enjoys near universal
acceptance."' 70
The counsel for amici concluded that the uniform international rejection
of the imposition of the death penalty on persons under the age of eighteen at
the time of the commission of the crime is "strong evidence" that such a
practice is inconsistent with the Eighth Amendment and, thus, should be
deemed cruel and unusual.' 7 ' This amici brief reprimanded the United
States, stressing that "[t]he United States cannot continue to demand compli-
ance with human rights principles and norms abroad while it refuses to apply
them in its own country."' 72 Yet these amici were not alone in their stance.
B. The European Union
On July 12, 2004, the European Union (EU) also submitted a brief of
amici curiae in support of Simmons.'73 The brief was filed on behalf of its
twenty-five Member States'74 and in the shared interest of Canada, the Coun-
cil of Europe, 7' Iceland, Liechtenstein, Mexico, New Zealand, Norway, and
Switzerland.'76 The EU asserted that there is an international consensus
against imposing the death penalty upon offenders below the age of eight-
een. 177 Evidencing its argument, the EU relied upon "the practices of the
overwhelming majority of nations," international law and treaties, along with
international norms and standards. 178 As a threshold matter, the EU urged
that "'the views of the international community [are relevant] in determining
whether a [particular] punishment is cruel and unusual. ' 179
169. Id. at 22.
170. Id.
171. Id. at25.
172. Brief for England, supra note 150, at 25.
173. Brief for the European Union, supra note 150.
174. Id. at 1. The Member States include: Austria; Belgium; Cyprus; Czech Republic;
Denmark; Estonia; Finland; France; Germany; Greece; Hungary; Ireland; Italy; Latvia;
Lithuania; Luxembourg; Malta; the Netherlands; Poland; Portugal; Slovakia; Slovenia; Spain;
Sweden; and the United Kingdom. Id.
175. Id. at 3. The Council of Europe is a political organization comprised of forty-six
countries, including twenty-one countries from Central and Eastern Europe. About the Coun-
cil of Europe, http://www.coe.int/T/e/Com/about_coel (last visited Apr. 2, 2006).
176. Brief for the European Union, supra note 150, at 3.
177. Id. at 6.
178. Id.
179. Id. at 7 (quoting Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815, 830 n.31 (1988)).
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These amici found it significant that "[slince 1990, only eight countries
reportedly executed children: Iran (8), Saudi Arabia (1), Nigeria (1), the
Democratic Republic of Congo ("DRC") (1), Yemen (1), Pakistan (3), China
(1) and the United States (19)." '' ° These countries have either now abolished
the use of the juvenile death penalty, are in the process of doing so, or deny
that they have executed juvenile offenders.18 1 This amici brief concluded
that the United States presently "stands virtually alone among all the nations
of the world" in imposing the death sentence for offenses committed by indi-
viduals under the age of eighteen. 8 2
These amici also commented on the fact that a considerable number of
treatises, some of which have been signed or ratified by the United States,
prohibit the imposition of the death penalty for offenses committed by indi-
viduals below the age of eighteen. 183 The United Nations Convention on the
Rights of the Child (CRC),84 ratified by roughly 192 nations, "is the most
widely ratified human rights treaty in the world" and prohibits the imposition
of the death penalty on juveniles.' "The [United States] and Somalia are
the only two nations [in the world] that have not ratified the CRC," but both
countries have signed it, indicating an intent to ratify. 186 This amici brief
pointed to the Vienna Convention on the Laws of Treaties, an authoritative
guide on treaty procedure, which instructs that after signing a treaty and prior
to ratification, "a nation is oblig[ated] to 'refrain from acts which would de-
feat the object and purpose of the treaty. ' ' ' 87
Likewise, these amici pointed to Article 6(5) of the International Cove-
nant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), which prohibits the imposition of
the death penalty upon juvenile offenders. 8 The United States "ratified [the
ICCPR] in 1992 with a reservation to Article 6(5), stating that 'the United
States reserves the right, subject to its Constitutional constraints, to impose"'
the death penalty upon juvenile offenders. 8 9 This reservation was made de-
180. Id. at 8-9.
181. See Brief for the European Union, supra note 150, at 9-11.
182. Id. at 11.
183. Id. at 12.
184. Convention of the Rights of the Child, supra note 162, at art. 37(a).
185. Brief for the European Union, supra note 150, at 12.
186. Id.
187. Id. at 12 (quoting Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, supra note 162, at art.
18).
188. Id. at 14. Article 6(5) of the ICCPR specifically states that a .'[s]entence of death
shall not be imposed for crimes committed by persons below eighteen years of age."' Id.
(quoting International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights art. 6(5), adopted Dec. 19, 1966,
999 U.N.T.S. 171 [hereinafter ICCPR]).
189. Brief for the European Union, supra note 150, at 14.
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spite the fact that Article 4(2) of the ICCPR does not permit derogation from
Article 6 "even in times of public emergency, thus indicating that Article 6 is
seen to be inherent to the object and purpose of the ICCPR."' This amici
brief mentioned other agreements, such as the Arab Charter on Human
Rights,' 9' the American Convention on Human Rights, 192 and the Fourth Ge-
neva Conventions, 93 that also prohibit the imposition of the death penalty on
juvenile offenders. 94
Lastly, these amici found that "[i]nternational norms and standards
adopted by international bodies and organisations, including the United Na-
tions, further reflect the international consensus against the death penalty for
juvenile offenders."' 95 The counsel for these amici concluded that a national
consensus exists against the imposition of the death penalty upon individuals
below the age of eighteen, and the United States' position on this issue "is
out of step with the international community, [presenting] both legal and
diplomatic issues."'
196
V. THE DECISION: ROPER V. SIMMONS
A. The Majority
On March 1, 2005, the United States Supreme Court once again con-
fronted the issue of whether the execution of persons who were sixteen or
seventeen years of age at the time of the commission of the crime violates
the Eighth Amendment's prohibition of cruel and unusual punishment.' 97
190. Id. at 14-15; ICCPR, supra note 188, art. 4(2).
191. Brief for the European Union, supra note 150, at 18 (citing Arab Charter on Human
Rights, reprinted in 18 HUM. RTS. L.J. 151 (1997) [hereinafter Arab Charter]). The Arab
Charter on Human Rights states that the "[t]he death penalty shall not be inflicted on a person
under 18 years of age." Arab Charter, supra, at 152.
192. Brief for the European Union, supra note 150, at 19 (citing American Convention on
Human Rights art. 4(5), Nov. 22, 1969, 1144 U.N.T.S. 123 [hereinafter American Conven-
tion]). The American Convention on Human Rights provides that .'[clapital punishment shall
not be imposed upon persons who, at the time the crime was committed, were under 18 years
of age."' Id. at 19 (quoting American Convention, supra, art. 4(5)).
193. Id. at 21 (citing Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in
Time of War art. 68, Aug. 12, 1949, 75 U.N.T.S. 287 [hereinafter Fourth Geneva Conven-
tion]). The Fourth Geneva Convention states in Article 68 that "'the death penalty may not be
pronounced against a protected person who was under eighteen years of age at the time of the
offence."' Id. (quoting Fourth Geneva Convention, supra, art. 68).
194. Id. at 18-21.
195. Brief for the European Union, supra note 150, at 21.
196. Id. at 26.
197. Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551,555-56 (2005).
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Justice Kennedy delivered the majority opinion of the Court, joined by Jus-
tices Stevens, Souter, Ginsburg, and Breyer.'98 The Court rendered its deci-
sion based on objective indicium, particularly relevant legislative enact-
ments, as well as an independent determination by the Court.' 99 Addition-
ally, the Court found confirmation from the opinion of the international
community.2"
Recognizing that the Eighth Amendment forbids excessive sanctions,
the Court reaffirmed "the necessity of referring to 'the evolving standards of
decency that mark the progress of a maturing society' to determine which
punishments are so disproportionate as to be cruel and unusual."' ' In a 5-4
decision, the Court overruled Stanford, holding that society's standards have
changed since that decision and the evolving standards have changed to indi-
cate that the imposition of the death penalty on such individuals is forbidden
by the Eighth and the Fourteenth Amendments.2°2
The Court looked at objective indicium in determining that a national
consensus has formed since Stanford against the juvenile death penalty.2 3
Looking at the relevant legislative enactments, the Court relied heavily on
Atkins, outlining the similarities between the constitutionality of executing
the mentally retarded and executing juvenile offenders:
When Atkins was decided, 30 States prohibited the death penalty
for the mentally retarded. This number comprised 12 that had
abandoned the death penalty altogether, and 18 that maintained it
but excluded the mentally retarded from its reach. By a similar
calculation in this case, 30 States prohibit the juvenile death pen-
alty, comprising 12 that have rejected the death penalty altogether
and 18 that maintain it but, by express provision or judicial inter-
pretation, exclude juveniles from its reach. Atkins emphasized that
even in the 20 States without formal prohibition, the practice of
executing the mentally retarded was infrequent.
20 4
Similarly, the practice of executing juveniles is infrequent in the states
without a formal prohibition against such a practice.2 5 Since Stanford, only
198. Id. at 554.
199. Id. at 564.
200. Id. at 575.
201. Id. at 561 (quoting Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 101 (1958)).
202. Roper, 543 U.S. at 574.
203. Id. at 564.
204. Id. (citations omitted).
205. Id.
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six states have imposed the death penalty on juvenile offenders.' ° Likewise,
only five states executed the mentally retarded since Penry v. Lynaugh, the
predecessor case to Atkins. °7
The Court noted that despite the striking similarities between the pre-
sent case and Atkins, there is at least one difference between the cases per-
taining to evidence of a national consensus.0 8 During the thirteen year pe-
riod between the decisions of Penry and Atkins, sixteen additional states pro-
hibited the practice of executing the mentally retarded.2°9 "[Tihe rate of abo-
lition of the death penalty for the mentally retarded" during this period was
significant.10
To the contrary, the rate of abolishing the juvenile death penalty has
been slower.2z In the fifteen intervening years since Stanford, only five ad-
ditional states have prohibited the juvenile death penalty, "four through legis-
lative enactments and one through judicial decision.212 The Court consid-
ered this change since Stanford significant, despite the "less dramatic"
change from Penry to Atkins, stressing that "'[i]t is not so much the number
of these States that is significant, but the consistency of the direction of
change.' '2 13 Since Stanford, there has been a consistent direction of change
against the juvenile death penalty-with no states reinstating it.2 14
The Court concluded that, similar to Atkins, looking at objective indicia
such as "the rejection of the juvenile death penalty in the majority of States;
the infrequency of its use even where it remains on the books; and the con-
sistency in the trend toward abolition of the practice" provides evidence of a
national consensus against executing such individuals.1 5
The Court also made its own independent evaluation of the constitu-
tionality of the juvenile death penalty under the Eighth Amendment.21 6 The
Court emphasized that "the death penalty is the most severe punishment,
[and therefore] the Eighth Amendment applies to it with special force.2 17
The imposition of the death penalty "must be limited to those offenders who
206. Id. at 564-65.
207. Roper, 543 U.S. at 564.
208. Id. at 565.
209. Id.
210. Id.
211. Id.
212. Roper, 543 U.S. at 565 (citations omitted).
213. Id. at 566 (quoting Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 315 (2002)).
214. Id.
215. Id. at 567.
216. See id. at 567-75.
217. Roper, 543 U.S. at 568 (citing Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815, 856 (1988)
(O'Connor, J., concurring in judgment)).
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commit 'a narrow category of the most serious crimes' and whose extreme
culpability makes them 'the most deserving of execution.' 2,1 8 The Court
noted three differences between juveniles and adults that categorically re-
move juveniles from the classification of the worst offenders.2 9 First, juve-
niles tend to be less mature and more irresponsible than adults.220 States rec-
ognize this fact and, hence, prohibit juveniles from enjoying many privileges
that adults have such as "voting, serving on juries, or marrying without pa-
rental consent. '221 Secondly, "juveniles are more vulnerable or susceptible to
negative influences and outside pressures, including peer pressure.
' 222
Lastly, because juveniles go through so many changes, their character "is not
as well formed as that of an adult. 22' 3 The Court found that "[t]hese differ-
ences render suspect any conclusion that a juvenile falls among the worst
offenders."224
The Court also concluded that the penological justifications for the
death penalty are not served with the same force when applied to juveniles.2 5
First, "[r]etribution is not proportional if the law's most severe penalty is
imposed on one whose culpability or blameworthiness is diminished, to a
substantial degree, by reason of youth and immaturity.22 6 Second, "[a]s for
deterrence, it is unclear whether the death penalty has a significant or even
measurable deterrent effect on juveniles, as counsel for the petitioner ac-
knowledged at oral argument. '227 Even if the death penalty were to have a
deterrent effect on juveniles, the sanction of life imprisonment without the
possibility of parole would also deter such persons, particularly juveniles
who have their entire life ahead of them. 228
The petitioner argued that even if juveniles in general have a diminished
level of culpability, a categorical bright-line rule barring the death penalty on
any juvenile offender "is both arbitrary and unnecessary.2 29 Petitioner as-
serted that jurors should decide if the death penalty is appropriate for juve-
nile offenders on a case-by-case basis, taking into consideration mitigating
218. Id. (quoting Atkins, 536 U.S. at 319).
219. Id. at 569.
220. Id.
221. Id.
222. Roper, 543 U.S. at 569 (citing Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455 U.S. 104, 115 (1982)).
223. Id. at 570.
224. Id.
225. Id. at 571.
226. Id.
227. Roper, 543 U.S. at 571.
228. See id. at 572.
229. Id.
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factors related to youth.23" The Court disagreed with this argument, finding
that the task of deciding whether a juvenile should receive the death penalty
is too difficult of an inquiry for jurors.23 ' Even expert psychologists have
difficulty in distinguishing whether a juvenile offender acts due to his or her
immaturity or acts a result of his or her "irreparable corruption" of charac-
ter.232 However, the Court did acknowledge that a bright-line rule is not
flawless:
Drawing the line at 18 years of age is subject, of course, to the ob-
jections always raised against categorical rules. The qualities that
distinguish juveniles from adults do not disappear when an indi-
vidual turns 18. By the same token, some under 18 have already
attained a level of maturity some adults will never reach ...
[H]owever, a line must be drawn.233
The Court found that drawing the line at eighteen is appropriate because this
is where society commonly marks the line between a child and an adult.
234
Based on its own determination, the Court concluded that due to the
diminished capacity of juveniles and the lack of penological justifications for
imposing the death penalty on such offenders, the death penalty is a dispro-
portionate punishment for juveniles.235  The Court pronounced "[w]hen a
juvenile offender commits a heinous crime, the State can exact forfeiture of
some of the most basic liberties, but the State cannot extinguish his life and
his potential to attain a mature understanding of his own humanity. 236
Lastly the Court pointed to "overwhelming weight of international opin-
ion against the juvenile death penalty. 237 The Court stated that "[t]he opin-
ion of the world community, while not controlling our outcome, does provide
respected and significant confirmation for our own conclusions. 238  The
Court found confirmation that the death penalty is excessive punishment for
juveniles due to the fact "that the United States is the only country in the
world" that officially continues to carry out such a sanction. 23 9 Looking at
international treaties and practices prohibiting the juvenile death penalty, the
230. Id.
231. See id. at 573.
232. Roper, 543 U.S. at 573.
233. Id. at 574.
234. Id.
235. See id. at 567-74.
236. Id. at 573-74.
237. Roper, 543 U.S. at 578.
238. Id.
239. Id. at 575.
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Court concluded that "it is fair to say that the United States now stands alone
in a world that has turned its face against the juvenile death penalty."2'
While looking at the international authority, the Court noted that the
United States Constitution still earns the highest respect, and its doctrines
remain essential to our national identity.24' The Court explained how looking
at an international opinion does not defy the Constitution: "[i]t does not
lessen our fidelity to the Constitution or our pride in its origins to acknowl-
edge that the express affirmation of certain fundamental rights by other na-
tions and peoples simply underscores the centrality of those same rights
within our own heritage of freedom., 242 The Court emphasized that an inter-
national opinion is not controlling in the Court's Eighth Amendment inter-
pretation, however it is instructive.243
B. Justice Stevens, Concurring
Concurring in the judgment, Justice Stevens, joined by Justice Ginsburg
agreed with the majority opinion and emphasized that interpreting the Con-
stitution is not a static task:
Perhaps even more important than our specific holding today is our
reaffirmation of the basic principle that informs the Court's inter-
pretation of the Eighth Amendment. If the meaning of that
Amendment had been frozen when it was originally drafted, it
would impose no impediment to the execution of 7-year-old chil-
dren today. 244
Justice Stevens found it important for the Court to adjust its interpreta-
tion of the Eighth Amendment in accordance with the evolution of society.245
He postulated that if Alexander Hamilton were alive today, sitting with the
Court, he would also join the majority in its decision.2"
C. Justice O'Connor, Dissenting
Justice O'Connor dissented, contending that there was a lack of evi-
dence to support the Court's categorical prohibition against the juvenile
240. Id. at 577.
241. Id. at 578.
242. Roper, 543 U.S. at 578.
243. Id. at 575 (citing Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 102-03 (1958)).
244. Id. at 587 (Stevens, J., concurring) (citation omitted).
245. See id.
246. Id.
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death penalty.247 Justice O'Connor asserted that neither the objective evi-
dence of a national consensus, nor the Court's independent assessment,
which she referred to as "the Court's moral proportionality analysis," sup-
ported this categorical prohibition.2" Finding that so little had changed since
the Court's decision in Stanford, Justice O'Connor pronounced that she
"would not substitute [the Court's] judgment about the moral propriety of
capital punishment for 17-year-old murderers for the judgments of the Na-
tion's legislatures," but would rather wait for a patent showing that society is
against such a practice before categorically forbidding it.249
Justice O'Connor pointed to the Court's decision in Thompson, in
which she concurred, acknowledging that a national consensus existed
against imposing the death penalty on fifteen-year-old offenders, but she
"declined to adopt that conclusion as a matter of constitutional law without
clearer evidentiary support. '  Yet again in the Court's decision of Stanford,
Justice O'Connor concurred with the Court's judgment that imposing the
death penalty on sixteen and seventeen-year-old offenders was not prohibited
by the Eighth Amendment."' Justice O'Connor concluded that there was not
a national consensus against such a practice and that the "proportionality
arguments," much the like the Court's arguments in Roper, "did not justify a
categorical Eighth Amendment rule against capital punishment of 16- and
17-year-old offenders. 252
Justice O'Connor agreed that the objective evidence presented in Roper
was similar to that presented in Atkins, but found that the evidence of a na-
tional consensus in Roper was weaker than the evidence in Atkins:
Most importantly, in Atkins there was significant evidence of op-
position to the execution of the mentally retarded, but there was
virtually no countervailing evidence of affirmative legislative sup-
port for this practice. The States that permitted such executions
did so only because they had not enacted any prohibitory legisla-
tion. Here, by contrast, at least eight States have current statutes
that specifically set 16 or 17 as the minimum age at which com-
247. Roper, 543 U.S. at 587-88 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
248. Id.
249. Id. at 588.
250. Id. at 591 (citing Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815, 849 (1988) (O'Connor, J.,
concurring in judgment)).
251. Id. (citing Stanford v. Kentucky, 492 U.S. 361, 381 (1989) (O'Connor, J., concurring
in part and concurring in judgment)).
252. Roper, 543 U.S. at 592 (O'Connor, J., dissenting) (citing Stanford, 492 U.S. at 382
(O'Connor, J., concurring)).
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mission of a capital crime can expose the offender to the death
penalty. 253
Justice O'Connor found it noteworthy that of the eight states that still permit-
ted the juvenile death penalty, five of these states had juvenile offenders on
death row and four of them had executed such offenders in the past fifteen
years.2 4 She pointed to the fact that there were over seventy juveniles on
death row at the time of the decision of Roper, adducing the actuality of
"continuing public support" for upholding the juvenile death penalty.1 5
Justice O'Connor also found that the proportionality argument against
the juvenile death penalty to be "so flawed that it can be given little, if any,
analytical weight., 256 She argued that the differences between a seventeen-
year-old and young adults are not clear "enough to justify a bright-line pro-
phylactic rule against capital punishment of the former., 257 She criticized the
line drawn by the Court to be "indefensibly arbitrary," claiming that it may
protect those juvenile "offenders who are mature enough to deserve the death
penalty., 258 Justice O'Connor found individualized sentencing by juries to
be more appropriate than a bright-line rule. 59 She pointed out that the Court
provided no evidence for its argument that sentencing juries cannot ascertain
the juvenile's level of maturity to give appropriate weight to mitigating fac-
tors, asserting that this task is no different than sentencing juries "giving
proper effect to any other qualitative capital sentencing factor."'
Justice O'Connor also criticized the Court for failing to admonish the
Supreme Court of Missouri for not following the precedent set out by the
United States Supreme Court in Stanford.26' She stated that "[b]y affirming
the lower court's judgment without so much as a slap on the hand, today's
decision threatens to invite frequent and disruptive reassessments of our
Eighth Amendment precedents. 262
253. Id. at 595-96 (citations omitted).
254. Id. (citing VICTOR L. STREIB, THE JUVENILE DEATH PENALTY TODAY: DEATH
SENTENCES AND EXECUTIONS FOR JUVENILE CRIMES, JANUARY 1, 1973 - DECEMBER 31, 2004, at
24-31 (2005), available at http://www.law.onu.edu/faculty/streib/documents/
JuvDeathDec2004.pdf.
255. Id. at 596 (citing STREIB, supra note 254, at 11, 24-31).
256. Id. at 598.
257. Roper, 543 U.S. at 601 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
258. Id. at 601-02.
259. Id. at 602-03.
260. Id. at 603-04.
261. Id. at 593-94.
262. Roper, 543 U.S. at 594 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
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Justice O'Connor agreed with the majority on one issue: that foreign
and international law can be pertinent to Eighth Amendment evaluations.263
She stated that "the existence of an international consensus ... can serve to
confirm the reasonableness of a consonant and genuine American consen-
sus." 26 Because she did not find a genuine national consensus in this case,
however, she did not think that "the recent emergence of an otherwise global
consensus" could replace the lack of a national consensus against the juve-
nile death penalty.265
D. Justice Scalia, Dissenting
Justice Scalia, joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justice Thomas,
also dissented, arguing that not only was there a lack of evidence showing
the development of a national consensus against the juvenile death penalty,
but moreover they discredited the modern usage of the national consensus
test in general.266 Rather than using "the evolving standards of decency" to
determine what punishments are cruel and unusual, Justice Scalia would re-
fer to "the original meaning of the Eighth Amendment.2 67 Justice Scalia
also disagreed with the Court acting as a "sole arbiter of our Nation's moral
standards" in making an independent judgment on the issue, as well as taking
guidance from international opinions.26
Justice Scalia scrutinized the Court's evidence of a national consen-
sus.269 He criticized the majority for counting non-death penalty states to-
ward evidence of a national consensus against the imposition of the death
penalty on sixteen and seventeen-year-olds.27 ° Justice Scalia objected to the
relevancy of the twelve states that prohibit the death penalty in all cases be-
cause, in repealing the death penalty, the states did not consider the same
determinative factors decided by the Court with respect to juvenile offenders,
such as levels of culpability and maturity.271
Justice Scalia also took issue with the Court's reliance on the legislative
changes since Stanford.272 He did not find the fact that only four states since
Stanford have changed its laws to prohibit the juvenile death penalty signifi-
263. Id. at 604.
264. Id. at 605.
265. Id.
266. Id. at 607-11 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
267. Roper, 543 U.S. at 608 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (citation omitted).
268. Id.
269. See id.
270. Id. at 610-11.
271. Id.
272. Roper, 543 U.S. at 613 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
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cant enough for the Court to take the matter out of the legislature's hands.273
Scalia contended that "[w]ords have no meaning if the views of less than
50% of death penalty States can constitute a national consensus. '274
In addition to disagreeing with the evidence of a national consensus,
Justice Scalia did not find it appropriate that the Court exercised its own in-
dependent judgment in coming to the conclusion that the death penalty is an
inappropriate punishment for all juveniles. 75 Justice Scalia objected "to sup-
plant[ing] the consensus of the American people with the Justices' views"
asserting "that it has no foundation in law or logic. '276 Justice Scalia found
the Court's role in evaluating the "evolving-standards" test is solely to de-
termine if a national moral consensus exists. 77 Justice Scalia posed the ques-
tion: "By what conceivable warrant can nine lawyers presume to be the au-
thoritative conscience of the Nation?
278
Justice Scalia further attacked the Court for exercising its own inde-
pendent judgment, stating that:
Today's opinion provides a perfect example of why judges are ill
equipped to make the type of legislative judgments the Court in-
sists on making here. To support its opinion that States should be
prohibited from imposing the death penalty on anyone who com-
mitted murder before age 18, the Court looks to scientific and so-
ciological studies, picking and choosing those that support its posi-
tion. It never explains why those particular studies are methodol-
ogically sound; none was ever entered into evidence or tested in an
adversarial proceeding.279
Justice Scalia observed that the Court "need not look far to find studies"
showing otherwise."' Justice Scalia also posited the fact that the legislatures
are in the best position to look at the results of statistical studies in light of
their own local conditions.28' Justice Scalia found it significant that even
looking at the studies cited by the Court, "[n]ot one ... opines that all indi-
viduals under 18 are unable to appreciate the nature of their crimes. 282
273. Id. at 613-14.
274. Id. at 609 (citation omitted).
275. Id. at 615-16.
276. Id.
277. Roper, 543 U.S. at 616 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
278. Id.
279. Id. at 616-17.
280. Id. at 617.
281. Id. at 618 (citing McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279, 319 (1987)).
282. Roper, 543 U.S. at 618 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
[Vol. 30:3:473
30
Nova Law Review, Vol. 30, Iss. 3 [2006], Art. 8
http://nsuworks.nova.edu/nlr/vol30/iss3/8
ABOLITION OF THE JUVENILE DEATH PENALTY
He also disagreed with the Court's explanation for drawing the line at
eighteen years old.283 Justice Scalia found that "[s]erving on a jury or enter-
ing into marriage also involve[s] decisions far more sophisticated than the
simple decision not to take another's life.,, 284 Furthermore, Justice Scalia
established that, in imposing these types of age limitations, states make cate-
gorical determinations without looking at individual maturity levels.285 On
the other hand, he asserted that the criminal justice system "provides for in-
dividualized consideration of each defendant. 286
Justice Scalia also rejected the Court's use of international opinions in
its decision, denouncing that the "'[a]cknowledgment' of foreign approval
has no place in the legal opinion of this Court unless it is part of the basis for
the Court's judgment-which is surely what it parades as today. 2 7 Justice
Scalia explained that the fact that the President of the United States and the
Senate have not entered into treaties prohibiting the juvenile death penalty
only further evidences that the United States has not reached a national con-
sensus against it.
28
Justice Scalia also referred to the United Nations Convention on the
Rights of the Child, explaining that it not only prohibits the juvenile death
penalty, but also prohibits life imprisonment of juveniles. 289 He pointed out
that if the United States is to remain consonant "with the international com-
munity, then the Court's reassurance that the death penalty is really not
needed, since 'the punishment of life imprisonment without the possibility of
parole is itself a severe sanction,' gives little comfort.
' 290
V. EFFECTS OF THE COURT'S RULING
A. Nationwide Effects
The United States Supreme Court's ruling in Roper spared seventy-two
juvenile offenders' lives nationwide by commuting their death sentences to
life imprisonment. 29' Thirteen states at the time of the decision had juveniles
283. See id. at 619.
284. Id.
285. Id. at 620.
286. Id.
287. Roper, 543 U.S. at 628 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
288. Id. at 622-23.
289. Id.; Convention on the Rights of the Child, supra note 167, at art. 37(a).
290. Roper, 543 U.S. at 623 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (citation omitted).
291. Chris Tisch, Supreme Court Rules on Juvenile Death Penalty: Only Adults Can Face
Execution, ST. PETERSBURG TIMES, Mar. 2, 2005, at IA; see also STREi, supra note 254, at
11, 24-31.
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on death row: Texas (28); Alabama (13); Mississippi (5); Arizona (4); Lou-
isiana (4); North Carolina (4); Florida (3); South Carolina (3); Georgia (2);
Pennsylvania (2); Virginia (1); and Nevada (1).292 The decision had the ef-
fect of invalidating laws in twenty states that permitted the juvenile death
penalty.293
The implications of this ruling were immediately felt in Prince William
County, Virginia, where prosecuting attorney Paul Ebert was considering
trying Washington D.C. area sniper Lee Boyd Malvo on capital charges, but
stated that "in light of this decision, [he] will not do so."294 Malvo was sev-
enteen-years-old at the time of the shooting spree in 2002 and had already
been convicted and sentenced to life in prison for two of the ten murders. 295
Prosecutors were planning to try him in other jurisdictions in hopes of ob-
taining a death sentence. 2' Ebert criticized the Supreme Court's decision
stating that he personally believes "'you can't draw a bright line between a
17-year-old and an 18-year-old.' ' 297 In regards to Malvo's crimes, Ebert
thought they "were meticulously planned-not the negligent act of a mi-
nor."
298
The difficulty in drawing a bright-line rule was clearly illustrated in the
case of brothers Kevin and Tilmon Golphin.299 In 1997, the brothers robbed
a finance company in South Carolina, stole a car, and drove off on the inter-
state heading north.3" They were pulled over near Fayetteville, North Caro-
lina by Highway Patrol Trooper Ed Lowry who called for back up after real-
izing that they were driving a stolen vehicle.0 1 When Deputy David Hatch-
cock arrived, nineteen-year-old Tilmon Golphin shot both men with a semi-
automatic rifle, seriously wounding them.3" 'Then, as the men lay wounded,
the 17-year-old [Kevin Golphin] took Lowry's pistol and finished them off,
292. Joan Biskupic, Supreme Court Strikes Down Death Penalty for Juveniles, USA
TODAY, Mar. 2, 2005, at IA, available at http://www.usatoday.com/news/washington/2005-
03-01 -scotus-juvenile_x.htm.
293. Id.
294. Mike M. Ahlers, Malvo Won't Stand Trial in Virginia Case, CNN.coM, Mar. 1, 2005,
http://www.cnn.com/2005/LAW/03/01/teen.sniper.
295. Id.
296. See id.
297. Id.
298. Id.
299. Valerie Bauman, Age Ruling Lets Older Brother Die, Other Live: Narrow Gap Be-
tween Partners in Murder Highlights Cutoff Conflict, CHARLOTrE OBSERVER, Mar. 17, 2005,
at 6B.
300. Id.
301. Id.
302. Id.
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shooting both officers to death at point-blank range. 3 °3 The brothers were
adjudged guilty of murder and were both sentenced to death.30, However,
the Court's ruling in Roper had the effect of releasing Kevin Golphin from
death row, while his brother Tilmon Golphin will remain there for essentially
the same crime.
305
Not all commentators favor this trend. Jordan Steiker, a death penalty
expert at the University of Texas law school, suggested that the decision may
lead to a judicial abolition of the death penalty in all cases.30 6 Steiker stated
that "'[the lasting significance of this case is that it opens the door to the
abolition of the death penalty judicially . . . . If a national consensus can
emerge without a majority of the death penalty states moving toward aboli-
tion, then it suggests that judicial abolition is a genuine prospect.' 30 7
B. Effects on Florida
Florida was one of the nineteen states that permitted the imposition of
the death penalty on juvenile offenders. 38 The ruling affected three juvenile
offenders on death row in Florida whose sentences will be reduced to life in
prison.309 Before 1994, Florida law allowed those facing life sentences to
have the possibility of parole after serving twenty-five years. 3'0 Two of the
three juvenile offenders formerly on death row in Florida committed their
crimes before a change in this law was made, so they may now become eli-
gible for parole.3 1
The two men are Cleo LeCroy, now forty-one-years-old, and James
Bonifay, now thirty-one-years-old.1 2 In 1986, LeCroy of Palm Beach
County was convicted for the murders of a young couple from Miami, John
303. Id.
304. Bauman, supra note 299.
305. See id.
306. Peter Franceschina, Juvenile Killers Spared Death, FT. LAUD. SUN SENT., Mar. 2,
2005, at IA.
307. Id.
308. Tisch, supra note 291; see also STREIB, supra note 254, at 24-31.
309. See Jackie Hallifax, Ruling Will Affect Florida's Death Row, TALL. DEM., Mar. 2,
2005, at A8.
310. Franceschina, supra note 306; see FLA. STAT. § 775.082(1) (1993), amended by FLA.
STAT. § 775.082(1) (1995). In 1993, section 775.082(1) of the Florida Statutes proscribed that
"[a] person who has been convicted of a capital felony shall be punished by life imprisonment
and shall be required to serve no less than 25 years before becoming eligible for parole." Id.
311. Franceschina, supra note 306.
312. Id.
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and Gail Hardeman, who were camping near the Florida Everglades 31  In
1991, Bonifay misidentified Billy Wayne Coker, a clerk at an auto parts store
in Pensacola, Florida, for another clerk that allegedly caused Bonifay's
cousin to get fired.314 Coker, the victim, had "pleaded for his life on behalf
of his wife and two children" before he died.31 5 "But... Bonifay told Coker
to 'shut up' and fired two [deadly] shots into his head. 31 6
Twenty-seven-year-old Nathan Ramirez was also on death row for a
crime committed as a juvenile and will no longer be executed, despite the
fact that two juries decided Ramirez should receive the death penalty. 317
However, Ramirez will be incarcerated for the rest of his life without the
possibility of parole because he committed the crime after the change of law
in Florida.18 In 1995, Ramirez and a friend broke into the home of seventy-
one-year-old widow Mildred Boroski to steal her birthday presents in Pasco
County, Florida.319 They beat her miniature poodle to death with a crow
bar.32  "Then they tied up the 71-year-old woman with telephone cords,
raped her and drove her to a grassy field, where they shot her twice in the
head with her late husband's .38-caliber revolver., 32' As a result of the bur-
glary, Ramirez and his friend stole "two guns, a pair of handcuffs, a ring, a
cordless phone and about $30, which the teenagers used to play video games
the next day. ' '322
VI. CONCLUSION
Our living document, the United States Constitution, is a symphony of
words that harmonize the collective conscience of our forbearers. This mas-
terpiece is dynamic and evolving in its performance, reflecting the prevailing
313. Scott Hiaasen, U.S. Supreme Court: Justices: States Can't Execute Juveniles, MIAMI
HERALD, Mar. 2, 2005, at Al.
314. Amber Bollman, Convicted in 1991 Murder, Parole Now Possible for Bonifay,
PENSACOLA NEws J., Mar. 2, 2005, at 4A.
315. Id.
316. Id.
317. Bridget Hall Grumet, Pasco Killer Might Escape Death Row, ST. PETE. TIMEs, Mar.
2,2005, at 1.
318. Franceschina, supra note 306; compare FLA. STAT. § 775.082(1) (1993) (prescribing
that "[a] person who has been convicted of a capital felony shall be punished by life impris-
onment and shall be required to serve no less than 25 years before becoming eligible for pa-
role"), with FLA. STAT. § 775.082(1) (1995) (prescribing that a person punished by life impris-
onment shall be ineligible for parole).
319. Grumet, supra note 317.
320. Id.
321. Id.
322. Id.
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wisdom of the day. No one person has the hand of change, but many have
fingerprints on the documents used as a basis for rulings to be rendered.
In Roper, the legal system of the United States addressed a topic
wrought with controversy of a multi-faceted nature.323 The concept of exe-
cuting persons for capital crimes they committed as juveniles merited con-
sideration at the highest level, presenting a quandary to the United States
Supreme Court that legal, moral, and religious beliefs do not always coin-
cide. When the "hands of change" were counted, the majority ruled by a 5-4
decision that capital punishment of juveniles violates the Eighth Amend-
ment's ban against "cruel and unusual" punishment. 24
The decision's significance goes beyond abolishing the juvenile death
penalty; it subjects the Eight Amendment's "cruel and unusual" punishments
clause to interpretation by the Justices based on their own subjective views.
In the progeny of case law since Thompson, the Court has slowly veered
away from the objective national consensus analysis of looking at the states
legislative enactments to decide the constitutionality of a particular punish-
ment. Instead, they have created leeway for Justices to instill their own be-
liefs as to what punishments are "cruel and unusual," supported by scientific
studies that endorse their individual views. As Justice Scalia noted in his
dissent, there is nothing in the law that allows the Justices "to supplant the
consensus of the American people" with their own personal views.325
Many question whether a categorical bright-line rule was appropriate
here. With the sad reality that juveniles kill, the questions become: What is
the proper punishment for these juvenile murderers? Should our laws as-
sume that no juvenile can act with the same level of culpability as that of an
adult and hence the death penalty is not appropriate for all juveniles? They
should not. The relationship between chronological age and levels of culpa-
bility is tenuous. There is serious doubt over whether one is less culpable at
the age of seventeen years and 364 days as compared to the day he or she
turns eighteen.
The majority is correct that a line must be drawn. However, the line
was drawn correctly in the Court's decision of Thompson, prohibiting the
death penalty on those under the age of sixteen.326 This left the decision-of
whether sixteen and seventeen year olds should be executed-to juries based
on case-by-case examinations of individual defendants in the states that per-
mitted the juvenile death penalty. This line was drawn correctly because
there was a clear national consensus of support.
323. Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 616 (2005) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
324. Id. at 578-79 (majority opinion).
325. Id. at 615 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
326. Thomson v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815, 838 (1988).
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The ruling in Roper has left many wondering what the role of interna-
tional opinion serves in our country's legal system. What did the majority
mean by stating that the international opinion provided "confirmation" of its
decision? It is difficult to see where international opinion fits into the in-
quiry of a national consensus. If we change this test to an international con-
sensus, we may find ourselves on a slippery slope, considering the fact that
many of the countries the Court looked to for "confirmation" forbid life im-
prisonment for juveniles and prohibit the death penalty in all cases.327
If the ruling does not stand the test of time, relief will be delivered by
the merits of each case as it progresses through the system. If one day in age
can be the difference between facing capital punishment or life imprison-
ment, the rigidity of this line is arbitrary and bound to produce injustice.
327. See, e.g., Brief for the European Union, supra note 150, at 1, 13.
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